Japan Expands Global Partnerships to Boost its Open RAN and 5G Ambitions

Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications last week signed an updated Memorandum of Cooperation with Colombia. This was Japan’s twelfth bilateral agreement focusing on forging stronger ICT partnerships with foreign governments signed in the past 15 months. It previously signed agreements with Brazil, Costa Rica, Denmark, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Paraguay, Portugal, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. On the face of it this looks like quite a random collection of countries. The inclusion of the provision to jointly develop “open, safe, and strong digital infrastructure including the diversification of 5G vendors” however suggests Japan is taking a more strategic approach in selecting technology focused trade partners.

Hopes that the U.S.-led ban on Chinese-produced network infrastructure, both domestically and within allied countries’ networks, would create opportunities for Open RAN to gain market share have diminished recently. Starting in 2023, the dramatic decline in CAPEX spending by mobile operators – who have largely struggled to fully monetise their 5G investments – has compounded the challenges Open RAN faces in trying to grow global adoption. And while most analysts predict Open RAN will drive the recovery in RAN spending in coming years, there is still no clear indication this will lead to greater diversification of suppliers, which remains a key selling point of the technology. As a result, Japanese companies like NEC and Fujitsu, both heavily invested in Open RAN, are finding it difficult to expand their market share.

This has certainly been the case in Europe where existing bans on Chinese produced infrastructure in countries like Denmark, Portugal and the UK, have yet to yield tangible results for alternative vendors. It shouldn’t come as too much of a surprise then that Japan’s government is stepping up its efforts to support some of its leading ICT companies – after all the sector accounts for 10% of its GDP.

For example, as part of its efforts, a number of its leading Open RAN players were invited to attend the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Open RAN Symposium hosted by the Japanese government at the end of 2023. Fujitsu, Rakuten Symphony and NTT DOCOMO are just some of the companies that gained invaluable access to senior government representatives from the region including those from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Interestingly the meeting also included representatives from the US State Department Agency for International Development (USAID). The American agency has also been actively promoting Open RAN in the region; it recently financed the Asian Open RAN Academy, based in the Philippines.

More recently, Japan, through its membership of the Quad, the strategic security dialogue it shares with Australia, India, and the United States, issued a joint statement which included a reiteration of the bloc’s support for Open RAN and a pledge to promote the technology within the Indo Pacific region. Given the inclusion of a thinly veiled condemnation of China’s activities in the South China Seas in the statement, many analysts viewed this as the latest salvo in the ongoing trade wars between some of the world’s largest economies. 

This in part explains the agreement with Kenya. The country, struggling under a burden of debt to China, has recently experienced civil unrest in response to government attempts a raising taxes to meet its obligations. In the meantime, large infrastructure projects remain incomplete due to a pause in Chinese investment and tensions between the two countries have risen, fuelled by rumours of state sponsored cyber attacks on Kenyan Government Institutions. 

The LatAm deals involving Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay, also make more sense when looked at through a geopolitical lens. The continent was infamously designated a US sphere of influence by the Monroe Doctrine, which contends that intervention in the region by foreign powers should be viewed as a potentially hostile act. The rise of Huawei in Latin America certainly seems to qualify as a threat under that definition according to some quarters within Washington.

Indeed, in February of this year Republican Senator Marco Rubio, Vice Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, issued a press release titled “Huawei Threatens Latin America’s Independence”. Rubio notes in the release that “At least seven countries in our region—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador—are using or planning to use Huawei technology in their national 5G networks. Huawei has also set up shop in Paraguay”. So far, despite pressure from the USA, only Costa Rica has issued a ban on Huawei, but even there, the country’s high court has suspended the order pending further investigations.

All this highlights an important and persistent dilemma not only for Japan’s Open RAN aspirations but also for the wider ecosystem of vendors, software developers and systems integrators trying to break into the RAN market. While diplomatic efforts and international political partnerships are critical to promoting Open RAN, the challenges extend beyond geopolitical manoeuvring. Mobile operators will continue to prioritise cost-efficiency, performance reliability, and technical support when considering technology deployments, especially in competitive and cost-sensitive markets. Without clear cost benefits or scalable solutions, many operators will remain hesitant to fully commit to Open RAN, let alone the multi-vendor version long promised by the open and disaggregated movement.